The UK Government has carefully designed a Capacity Mechanism to deliver reliable electricity. 
Much of the policy effort and academic discussion has focused on either the need for, or detailed design of, such Mechanisms. We consider here a third aspect: assessment of the amount to be procured. We examine the process for determining the procurement volume, compare the outcome against predictions, and draw lessons for future capacity procurement auctions. We conclude that the volume sought is likely to be excessive, particularly (but not exclusively) in its (lack of) assumed contribution from interconnectors. A conservative approach is understandable, but we argue costs can be substantially reduced by deferring some procurement until later auctions and including interconnectors.
The amount to procure on different timescales involves a delicate balance of risks. Not enough attention has been paid to either the political economy of this process, or the benefit of waiting and developing more options. The risk of over-procurement, particularly of new conventional capacity on long-term contracts, is that it drives up the costs to consumers; undermines renewable energy by implicitly transferring financial support from renewables to conventional generators; and impedes the EU Single Market by weakening the business case for other options, including future interconnectors.
We argue that the institutional arrangements for setting the volume were biased towards excessive procurement, leading to higher than needed capacity prices, lower energy prices that exacerbate the missing money problem with adverse impacts on financing renewable generation.
Excess procurement risks a vicious circle undermining the energy market and reinforcing the need for capacity payments. The use of an auction led to a better outcome for consumers than might have been expected, once again revealing the power of auctions to deliver cost-effective solutions, although the cost was still excessive.
The risk of over-procurement is increased by a confusion of terms: the traditional measure of 'loss of load' is increasingly divorced from any risk of the 'lights going out'. The development of technologies and market structures, particularly with respect to the demand-side and potentially available -'latent' -capacity further lowers the risks, and increases options. There is no 'cliff edge' at which the lights go out, but rather an increasing array of options for managing tight conditionsincluding the regional pooling of capacity implied by interconnectors. This in turn implies greater potential to defer the most expensive option of buying additional new conventional GB capacity.
Addressing market weaknesses and failures through improving the Balancing Mechanism and coupling interconnectors allows a more appropriate treatment of interconnectors in reliability assessments. As with other commodities (including food and gas) international trade supplements domestic production capacity and security is not synonymous with self-sufficiency. Yet the first GB auction neither included any positive overall contribution from interconnectors, nor enabled their participation in the first Capacity Auction despite a Government Impact Assessment that showed their potential to dramatically reduce consumer costs. Before the 2014 auction, and under some pressure from the European Commission arguing that the auction discriminated against foreign sources of reliability, the Government consulted on and then announced that it planned to include interconnectors in the 2015 capacity auction, but not for 2018-19 delivery.
Overall, we argue that there is considerable 'latent capacity' in the electricity system, including but by no means confined to interconnectors, which could be brought into play in the next few years and thus help to maintain reliability in the face of uncertain trends in electricity demand.
Given this, the costs of the (probably excessive) caution implied by the decision to procure 53.3GW for 2018-19 could have been substantially mitigated by deferring a much greater proportion of this to subsequent, shorter-term auctions.
